

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT NUMBER TWO - [REDACTED] - 14 NOVEMBER 1957

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Dear Marshall Bulganin:

Since our exchange of letters a year ago, two highly significant events have commanded the attention of the world. One is felicitous for mankind -- the other, ominously foreboding.

The happy event is the successful launching of the Russian satellites. I would be glad if, in my behalf, you would extend sincere congratulations to those responsible for this important achievement.

The tragic event is the failure of the disarmament negotiations to achieve any concrete success. Though differences have been narrowed, agreement still eludes us.

I am sure the implications of a continued technological arms race are clear and of heavy concern to you. The future will be tragic for humankind if technology remains harnessed to serve war, rather than peace and the noble purpose of man and his God.

In this letter I would like to deal with specific actions pertaining to both these events. Some of these actions I am now taking, and others I would like to suggest for your consideration.

With regard to satellites and space flight, it would seem important that our scientists and engineers work together on specific projects

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wherever possible. Such measures will help achieve an end we both prayerfully seek -- that space shall be used by men only for peaceful pursuits.

To this end, I would like to suggest that Soviet scientists launch some of the satellite instrumentations which our scientists have built for the I.G.Y. I believe such a joint project might produce certain scientific answers sooner than could either of our programs separately. It would also start us in joint endeavors for the peaceful exploration of space.

There is a second step which we should take immediately. As you know, during the recent disarmament negotiations, we suggested that an international scientific group be convened immediately to study the technical problems involved in controlling the use of space for peace. Could we not take prompt action, and thus embark immediately on yet another joint effort in space affairs?

On the horizon lies the exploration of the moon and planets. We would be pleased to examine with the Soviet Government the possibility of pooling our resources for interplanetary exploration.

By over-flying the United States with satellites, the Soviet Government has raised the legal question of national sovereignty in the upward direction. It has been pointed out that the situation is somewhat analogous to that which led to the establishment of the three-mile sovereignty limit for international

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waters in relation to the range of coastal gun fire at the time. I note that your two satellites are still passing over all the countries of the world. It will surely be unusual in the future not to find one vehicle or another over each nation's sovereign air spaces. The Soviet vehicles have established that there are limits to national sovereignty vertically -- a position we fully accept. Undoubtedly an international group should be convened shortly to begin technical discussions on this subject.

Meanwhile, the United States Government will act on the only practical basis possible -- namely, that national sovereignty extends as high into the air spaces as defensive military aircraft can operate and thus control.

In this nuclear age, we cannot assume that higher overflights are always for peaceful purposes. I therefore suggest that we immediately work out an arrangement to provide for the prior registration and inspection of all overflight vehicles above those air spaces which most nations can today control themselves and which therefore can be considered sovereign -- namely, the practical operating height of military aircraft.

As you know from my suggestions when we met in Geneva in July 1955, I deeply believe that mutual overflying of each others territory can very beneficially serve the interests of peace. Thus, in no way does the United States Government intend to protest nonaggressive overflights by the Soviet Government, regardless of whether your vehicles are used

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primarily for scientific observations of space, or for observation of the earth's surface as in aerial inspection. It has been intimated that observation of United States military activity is or will be accomplished by Soviet satellites. If so, I welcome this initiative by the Soviet Government as a concrete step toward aerial inspection.

As a second step to facilitate aerial inspection, I have designated (unnamed) Air Base in Alaska as the port of entry for Soviet aerial inspection aircraft. From today, you may notify the commander of that air base of the route from Siberia and estimated arrival times of your inspection aircraft. He will arrange for refueling, maintenance, interim landings of your inspection aircraft while over United States territory, for their inspection and the boarding of a United States monitoring official, and for the priority clearance of their flight plan through our air traffic control system to fly where you may like over the United States.

As you are aware, we are not dependent on USSR bases for our overflights. Therefore, I have ordered our aerial inspection of the USSR to commence, but at altitudes greatly in excess of USSR sovereign air spaces -- that is, at altitudes considerably greater than those normally defended by Soviet aircraft. The special vehicles and balloons we have built for this peaceful purpose are of course unarmed, and will fly so high that most will probably not be seen. But if they should have unforeseen difficulties, I am

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confident that the Soviet Government will provide for their safe return.

If you would prefer to put our aerial inspection of the USSR on the same basis as we have offered to you--namely, from a Soviet port of entry and lower altitude flights within Soviet sovereign air spaces -- we will be pleased to operate under an analogous arrangement. But the above interim system will suffice until hopefully you may be able to designate a port of entry and arrange other particulars for normal aerial inspection.

Additionally, the U.S. has under construction a satellite for aerial inspection, to supplement aircraft used for this purpose. We intend to commence test flights in 1959. Assuming that a U.N. arms-control agency is then in operation, we expect to make results from this inspection satellite available to that agency. In this connection your Government might wish to collaborate with us in making the best possible satellite inspection system available to the United Nations.

With further reference to the subject of disarmament, I would like to tell you of the other actions the U.S. Government is now taking in an effort to break the deadlock and bridge the slim remaining gap that unfortunately failed of negotiation in the recent parleys.

1. The U. S. Government has suspended all test of nuclear weapons, provided that no other nation conducts such test, provided that international inspection to control such a limitation is installed within one year, and

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provided that an agreement is reached and controls installed within two years so that henceforth all nuclear materials are produced for peaceful and not military purposes.

2. With regard to the question of inspection at ground control posts which you urged upon me at Geneva, we are prepared to receive immediately up to 500 Soviet inspectors in the U.S. for one year and arrange for their posting to watch our military movements at airfields, ports, railway centers and other such points of your choice. The arrangement can be extended if within their period, we can install a similar number in the USSR, or hopefully negotiate a more complete international agreement that would extend the area and objects of such control, and would also provide for mobile ground inspection operations.

3. Within six months the U.S. Government will reduce the number of its military effectives to 2,500,000. If the Soviet Government takes similar action, and if we can install a mutually satisfactory inspection system to verify conventional force levels, then the U.S. is prepared to make a further reduction.

4. With regard to renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has already renounced to clarify in an international convention just what is meant by their use in self-defense against both conventional and nuclear aggressions.

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Further to advance disarmament action, I am today writing President (unnamed) of the U.N. General Assembly to tell him of our plans to construct an inspection satellite and to offer its results to a U.N. arms control agency. I will also tell him of an aerial inspection force which we are organizing to place under the control of such an agency, to cover areas of the world not inspected under mutual arrangements. I shall also point out that all results from U.S. inspection efforts will be made available to a U.N. agency, on request.

I feel sure you will regard sympathetically this action to break the disarmament deadlock and to move concretely to free technology better to serve mankind in his peaceful pursuits. If our collaboration to this end can be advanced by meeting to discuss comments you may have regarding the above, and our possible future actions, I will be delighted to meet under U.N. auspices with you and with the heads of such other U.N. Governments as may be appropriate.

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Draft 2A

14 November 1957

Since our exchange of letters a year ago, two highly significant events have commanded the attention of the world. One is felicitous for mankind--the other, ominously foreboding.

The happy event is the successful launching of the Russian satellites. I would be glad if, in my behalf, you would extend sincere congratulations to those responsible for this important achievement.

The tragic event is the failure of the disarmament negotiations to achieve any concrete success. Though differences have been narrowed, agreement still eludes us.

I am sure the implications of a continued technological arms race are clear and of heavy concern to you. The future will be tragic for humankind if technology remains harnessed to serve War, rather than Peace and the noble purposes of man and his God.

In this letter I would like to deal with specific actions pertaining to both these events. Some of these actions I am now taking, and others I would like to suggest for your consideration.

With regard to satellites and space flight, it would seem important that our scientists and engineers work together on specific projects wherever possible. Such measures will help achieve an end we both prayerfully seek--that space shall be used by men only for peaceful pursuits.



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To this end, I would like to offer Soviet scientists some of the satellite instrumentations which our scientists have built for the I.G.Y. I believe such collaboration might produce certain scientific answers sooner than could either of our programs separately. I would also start us in joint endeavors for the peaceful exploration of space.

There is a second step which we should take immediately. As you know, during the recent disarmament negotiations, we suggested that an international scientific group be convened immediately to study the technical problems involved in controlling the use of space for peace. Could we not take prompt action, and thus embark immediately on yet another joint effort in space affairs?

On the horizon lies the exploration of the moon and planets. We would be pleased to examine with the Soviet government the possibility of pooling our resources for interplanetary exploration.

By over-flying the U.S. with satellites, the Soviet government has raised the legal question of national sovereignty in the upward direction. It has been pointed out that the situation is somewhat analogous to that which led to the establishment of the 3-mile off-shore sovereignty limit for national waters in relation to the range of coastal gun fire at the time. If there were any previous doubts the Soviet vehicles have now established that there are also vertical limits to national sovereignty. Undoubtedly an international group should be convened

shortly to begin technical discussions on this subject. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government will act on the only practical basis possible--namely, that national sovereignty extends as high into the air spaces as defensive military aircraft can operate and thus control.

I note that your two satellites are still passing over all the countries of the world. It will surely be unusual in the future not to find one vehicle or another over national air spaces. In this nuclear age, we cannot assume that higher overflights are always for peaceful purposes. I therefore suggest that we immediately work out an arrangement to provide for the prior registration and inspection of all overflight vehicles above those air spaces which most nations can today control themselves and which therefore can be considered sovereign--namely, the practical operating height of military aircraft.

As you know from my suggestions when we met in Geneva in July 1955, I deeply believe that mutual overflying of each other's territory can very beneficially serve the interests of Peace. Thus, in no way does the U.S. Government intend to protest non-aggressive overflights by the Soviet government, regardless of whether your vehicles are used primarily for scientific observation of space, or for observation of the earth's surface as in aerial inspection. It has been intimated that observation of U.S. military activity is or will be accomplished by Soviet satellites. If so, I welcome this initiative by the Soviet government as a concrete step toward "open skies" inspection.

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As a second step to facilitate aerial inspection, I have designated \_\_\_\_\_ Air Base in Alaska as the port of entry for Soviet inspection aircraft. Whenever you may wish to begin, if you will notify us of the route from Siberia and estimated arrival times of your inspection aircraft, we will arrange for refueling, maintenance, and interim landings of your inspection aircraft while over U.S. territory; for their inspection and the boarding of a U.S. monitoring official; and for the priority clearance of their flight plan through our air traffic control system to fly where you may like over the U.S.

As you are aware, we are not dependent on U.S.S.R. bases for our overflights. Our aerial inspection of the U.S.S.R. can commence from our existing bases and at altitudes greatly in excess of U.S.S.R. sovereign air spaces--that is, at altitudes considerably greater than those normally defended by Soviet aircraft. The special vehicles and balloons we have built for this peaceful purpose are of course unarmed, and will fly much higher than your normal commercial or military air traffic. We do not expect you will be caused any trouble whatsoever by these overflights. But if they should have unforeseen difficulties, I am confident that the Soviet Government will provide for their safe conduct and return.

If you would prefer to put our aerial inspection of the U.S.S.R. on the same basis we have offered to you--namely, lower flights within Soviet sovereign air space conducted from a Soviet port of entry--we will be pleased to operate in this

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manner. But the above interim system will suffice until hopefully you may be able to designate a port of entry and arrange other particulars for normal aerial inspection.

Additionally, the U.S. has under construction a satellite for space inspection, to supplement inspection aircraft. We intend to commence test flights in 1959. Assuming that a U.N. Arms Control Agency is then in operation, we expect to make results from this inspection satellite available to that agency. In this connection your government might wish to collaborate with us in making the best possible satellite inspection system available to the U.N.

Mutual satellite inspection, as you are well aware, is inevitable. What I am proposing is that it be established in such a way that its full potentialities are used to facilitate international arms control agreements.

With further reference to the subject of disarmament, the U.S. Government is now acting to break the deadlock and bridge the slim remaining gap that unfortunately failed of negotiation in the recent parleys. I believe you will find much in the following which meets the Soviet position.

1. The U.S. Government has temporarily suspended all tests of nuclear weapons. We will continue this suspension provided that no other nation conducts such tests, provided international agreement and inspection to control test limitations is immediately negotiated and installed, and provided that an agreement is reached promptly and controls installed within two years

so that all nuclear materials are thenceforth produced for peaceful and not military purposes.

2. With regard to the question of inspection at ground control posts which you urged upon me at Geneva, we are prepared to receive immediately up to 500 Soviet inspectors in the U.S. for one year and arrange for their posting to watch our military movements at airfields, ports, railway centers and other such points of your choice. The arrangement can be extended if within this period, we can install a similar number in the U.S.S.R., or hopefully negotiate a more complete international agreement that would extend the area and objects of such control, and would also provide for mobile ground inspection operations.

3. Within six months the U.S. Government will reduce the number of its military effectives to 2,500,000. If the Soviet government takes similar action, and if we can install a mutually satisfactory inspection system to verify conventional force levels, then the U.S. is prepared to make a further reduction.

4. With regard to renouncing the use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has already renounced their use except in self-defense. However, we stand prepared to clarify in an international convention just what is meant by their use in self-defense against both conventional and nuclear aggressions.

Further to advance disarmament action, I am today writing the President of the U.N. General Assembly to tell him of our plans to construct an inspection satellite and to offer its results to a U.N. Arms Control Agency. I will also tell him of an aerial

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inspection force which we are offering to place under the control of such an agency, to cover areas of the world not inspected under mutual arrangements. I shall also point out that all results from U.S. inspection efforts will be made available to a U.N. agency on request.

I feel sure you will regard sympathetically these actions to break the disarmament deadlock and to move concretely to free technology better to serve mankind in his peaceful pursuits. If our collaboration to this end can be advanced by meeting to discuss comments and actions regarding the above, or other arms control measures, I will be delighted to meet under U.N. auspices with you and with the heads of such other U.N. Governments as may be appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  <p style="text-align: center;">This is the paper I called you about this morning. The original was delivered to Mr. Mattison (Mr. Stassen's Staff) who will give it to Dr. Killian. (We received this through our signal center in Matomic Building.)</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; margin: 20px auto;"></div>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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FORM NO. 237  
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 30-4  
which may be used.

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There is a second step which we should take immediately. As you know, during the recent disarmament negotiations, we suggested that an international scientific group be convened immediately to study the technical problems involved in controlling the use of space for peace. Could we not take prompt action, and thus embark immediately on yet another joint effort in space affairs?

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Additionally, the U.S. has under construction a satellite for aerial inspection, to supplement aircraft used for this purpose. We intend to commence test flights in 1959. Assuming that a U.N. arms-control agency is then in operation, we expect to make results from this inspection satellite available to that agency. In this connection your Government might wish to collaborate with us in making the best possible satellite inspection system available to the U.N.

With further reference to the subject of disarmament, I would like to tell you of the other actions the U.S. Government is now taking in an effort to break the deadlock and bridge the slim remaining gap that unfortunately failed of negotiation in the recent parleys.

1. The U.S. Government has suspended all test of nuclear weapons, provided that no other nation conducts such test, provided that international inspection to control such a limitation is installed within one year, and provided that an agreement is reached and controls installed within two years so that henceforth all nuclear materials are produced for peaceful and not military purposes.

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2. With regard to the question of inspection at ground control posts which you urged upon me at Geneva, we are prepared to receive immediately up to 500 Soviet inspectors in the U.S. for one year and arrange for their posting to watch our military movements at airfields, ports, railway centers and other such points of your choice. The arrangement can be extended if within this period, we can install a similar number in the U.S.S.R., or hopefully negotiate a more complete international agreement that would extend the area and objects of such control, and would also provide for mobile ground inspection operations.

3. Within six months the U.S. Government will reduce the number of its military effectives to 2,500,000. If the Soviet Government takes similar action, and if we can install a mutually satisfactory inspection system to verify conventional force levels, then the U.S. is prepared to make a further reduction.

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